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GATT, ALTERED ECONOMICS, AND DISC: A
LEGITIMATE APPLICATION OF Rebus Sic Stantibus
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code operate to defer a certain percentage
of the income tax on foreign sales made through a DISC. Arguably,
this deferral constitutes a subsidy on exports prohibited by the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is the position of this
paper that, for the reasons enumerated below, while the DISC provi-
sions may be interpreted as a technical violation of certain sections
of GATT which prohibit export subsidies, general international prac-
tice and current international economic needs operate to make such
a technical violation fully justified.
1. GATT depends upon consensus and retaliation for its en-
forcement, as does public international law in general. Since many
countries utilize direct and indirect subsidy programs, and rebate or
impose border taxes, the operation of DISC would be justified as an
equivalent act by the United States. Since many provisions of GATT
are ignored now, it may be argued also that a de facto "amendment"
has been made, based on the desires of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.
2. Since the indirect taxes (such as an excise tax), as well as
the direct taxes (such as an income tax) are both carried forward and
reflected, to a certain extent, in the ultimate sales price, there is no
longer any economic reason to justify an interpretation of GATT
allowing the rebate of indirect, but not direct, taxes.
3. Any attempt at economic regulation rests upon a set of goals
articulated for a certain set of economic problems. When the eco-
nomic problems change, there is no justification for retaining old
solutions which may be regressive in the new situation. This is an
appropriate place for an application of the maxim rebus sic
stantibus.' GATT should be allowed to adjust to current economic
1. "The maxim Conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus is held to apply
to all cases in which the reason for a treaty has failed, or there has been such a change
in circumstances as to make its performance impracticable except at an unreasonable
sacrifice." Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887), citing WHARTON'S COM. Am.
LAW §161 (1880). It is the position of this Comment that the economic conditions that
exist in 1975 are such that certain sections of GATT are regressive or inequitable in
the modem context. The goals and problems considered when GATT was drafted are
significantly different from those that exist today, and thus the situation would fit the
requisites of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27, 23 May 1969; 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), which effectively allows the
use of a rebus sic stantibus argument if the existence of the original circumstances
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needs, and not be bound by the problems and solutions of 1947.
II. DISC
US. Export Incentives
The Revenue Act of 1971 created a new device aimed at the
encouragement of exports of American goods. The Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation (DISC) provisions2 enable exporters, when
channeling their sales through a DISC, to effectively reduce their tax
rate to as low as 24 percent in some instances.3
The DISC provisions are a part of a history of attempted tax
incentives for exports. Beginning with the China Trade Act Corpora-
tions, for which provisions were established in 1922,1 Congress has
subsequently authorized the establishment of Western Hemisphere
Trade Corporations,' and Export Trade Corporations, to promote
exports.
Outflows of American capital in the 1960's led to the establish-
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty,
and the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty. Much of the controversy surrounding an application
of the rebus maxim arises in the case of a changed government, and such a situation
is not present here. See also the following discussions of rebus sic stantibus: W. BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-23 (3d ed. 1971); J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 244 (4th ed. 1949);
G. HILL, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934); HUANG,
DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIc STANTIBUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1935); KAUFMAN, DAS WESEN
DES VOLKZRRECHTS UND DIE CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS (1911); POURITCH, DE LA
CLAUSE "REBUS Sic STANTIBus" (1918); B. SCHMIm, DIE VoLKERRECHTUCHE CLAUSULA
REBUS Sic STANTIBUS (1906); 1 E. VATrEL, LE Dnorr DES GENS, ch. 17, §296 (1758);
Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1097-1101 (1935); Hill,
The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law, 9 U. Mo. STUDIES, No. 3
(1934); Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM.
J. INT'L L. 895 (1967); Williams, The Permanence of Treaties, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 89
(1926).
It should be noted at the outset that this Comment takes the position that the
United States should behave as, and should be treated as, an equal in the community
of nations, and should not be expected to assume the position of economic invincibility
that was present in 1948 when GATT was ratified. Assuming this position, and apply-
ing the arguments discussed herein, this Comment reaches a conclusion opposite from
that reached by Anninger, DISC and GA TT: International Trade Aspects of Bringing
Deferral Home, 13 HABv. INT'L L.J. 391 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Anninger] and
Note, Domestic International Sales Corporation as a Subsidy Under Gatt: Possible
Remedies, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note], both of
which determined that the DISC program was an unjustified violation of GAT.
2. her. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 995 et seq. [hereinafter cited as CODE].
3. Hyde & Murphy, The Domestic International Sales Corporation in Perspective
and Operation, 28 Bus. LAW. 43 (1972).
4. CODE § 943.
5. CODE § 992, established in 1942.
6. CODE § 951.
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ment of Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Guidelines by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board,7 and jawboning by President Johnson for the
nation's businesses to restrict their foreign investments.8
It soon became apparent that more stringent measures were
needed, and, in 1968, the Office of Foreign Direct Investments was
established to regulate the transfer and retention of capital abroad
by U.S. businesses.' Yet, within two years of the imposition of these
measures, their ineffectiveness became apparent.'0 With a growing
balance of trade deficit, and an inability to otherwise reverse that
trend with other methods, the Treasury Department in 1970 proposed
the enactment of the DISC provisions.
First falling to defeat when it was attached to a textile quota
bill," DISC returned in the next session of Congress to be passed
amidst the general atmosphere of uncertainty that surrounded the
President's imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on imports and the
floating devaluation of the dollar in 1971. The DISC provisions, as
enacted, provided for the deferral of tax payments, as opposed to the
outright remission of taxes that would have been achieved by the
original DISC proposal.' 2 This deferral was believed to be (without,
perhaps, being given adequate consideration)' 3 acceptable under pro-
7. Hyde, supra note 3, at 50.
8. See Federal Reserve Press Release, dated February 18, 1965, Remarks of J. L.
Robertson, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to
representatives of banks and other financial institutions with respect to the President's
Balance of Payments Program, cited in Hyde, supra note 3, at 50 n. 30.
9. Executive Order 11,387 (Jan. 1, 1968), cited in Hyde, supra note 2, at 50 n. 30.
According to Manley Hudson, Jr., although the Foreign Direct Investments Program
was the principal balance of payments program, it was directed at the very component
of the balance of payments account that has most consistently produced a profit.
Hudson, Current Developments in Balance of Payments Restraints, in PRIVATE INVES-
TORs ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN 1969 at 191, 206.
10. Although the ineffectiveness of these provisions is generally conceded, Hudson
insisted that the programs prior to 1969 were quite successful, although more could
have been done. Id. at 201.
11. H.R. 20, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Treasury's original DISC proposal
was incorporated in a separate bill introduced by Representative Byrnes on July 9,
1970, as H.R. 18392, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This bill was subsequently incorpo-
rated, with considerable modification, in a bill that was intended to become the
"Trade Act of 1970," H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It was reported out of
the Ways and Means Committee favorably, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1435, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), was passed by the House, but died in the Senate Finance Committee
when Congress adjourned. Brudno, The DISC Proposal, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD
- PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN 1971 at 151, 154.
12. Id.
13. Patrick, Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) - The 1971
Legislation, in PRVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN 1972 at 323,
327.
124 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 5:121
visions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 4
which controls the deferral or rebate of taxes on exports. The DISC
provisions additionally had the ostensible appeal of creating an ex-
port incentive without the need for establishing a new "tax haven."' 5
The provisions of the DISC, although uncertain in their ultimate
effects in regard to stimulating additional exports, still represent one
valid attempt in this direction. While it may be argued that DISCs
were only utilized by those companies that were already in the export
business, and thus encouraged no new export activity, 6 there is also
evidence that the provisions did encourage some corporations, who
were otherwise reluctant, to establish export operations.'7 Even if the
DISC provisions did nothing more than increase exports from already
established exporters, the intended function arguably was then ac-
complished by encouraging more foreign sales of U.S. goods.
Provisions of DISC
Briefly, the DISC provisions of the Internal Revenue Code re-
quire that, in order to avoid the normal rates of federal taxation, the
DISC must confine its activities almost exclusively to export selling
and related activities; the DISC cannot act as a manufacturer."
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5 at All;
T.I.A.S. No. 1700; 55 U.N.T.S. 194 effective Jan. 1, 1948 [hereinafter cited as GATfT].
Although GAT'r has not been ratified by the Senate, it is valid and enforceable in the
U.S. as an executive agreement as long as it does not conflict with any legislation.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law,
66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 250 (1967).
15. -The purpose of the Export Trade Corporation (subpart F) and Western Hemi-
sphere Trade Corporation provisions was to make exporting at least as profitable from
the tax standpoint as manufacturing abroad. Subpart G gave deferrals on income to
businesses whose activities improved the balance of payments. But prior to the enact-
ment of DISC, all of these provisions shared one common fault: excess complexity.
Note, supra note 1, at 101. For a brief outline of the development of U.S. attitudes in
regard to foreign income, see J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLicy 139 (Rev. Ed. 1971).
16. Professor Stanley Surrey suggested the dropping of the DISC provisions en-
tirely, asserting that the same goals could be accomplished in other ways which would
avoid the "ludicrous windfalls now being obtained under DISC." Statement of S.
Surrey, Panel Discussion before the House Comm. on Ways and Means 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 24 (1973). In another hearing, a witness asserted that DISCs lost $1 billion
per year in revenue, and that 90 percent of the tax deferral was going to 10 percent of
the exporters. DISC allegedly helps medium sized manufacturers as opposed to me-
dium sized exporters, and was no help at all to the small manufacturer or exporter.
Testimony of C. McKay, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Procurement,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., H. Res. 5 and 19, at 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings
on Gov. Procurementl.
17. See e.g., Norton, DISC Helps Toro Boost Sales Abroad, JouRNAL OF
COMMERCE, Nov. 18, 1974, at 13A, col.1; according to S. Buchmer, DISCs help small
companies. 1972 Hearings on Gov. Procurement supra note 16, at 36.
18. This summary of the DISC provisions is adapted from Anninger, supra note
1, at 397-400.
GATT AND DISC
Under section 992, 95 percent of the assets and receipts of the DISC
must be export related, and it must maintain at all times the mini-
mum capital of $2500.11
There are four potential areas of tax saving through utilization
of a DISC. Most obvious is that federal tax is deferred on one-half of
the taxable income until it is distributed to the shareholders as a
dividend. 0 The tax free profits may be retained by the DISC and
reinvested in its export activities, they may be invested in Export-
Import Bank obligations, or may be used as "producer's loans" to
related or unrelated U.S. manufacturers for their export operations.
The shareholders are treated as receiving the other one-half of the
DISC income whether or not it was actually distributed."'
The second DISC benefit is the ability of the parent corporation
to borrow income from a DISC in five-year "producer's loans."2
These loans are, in effect, interest free, "assuming the interest is
actually distributed as a dividend by the DISC. The reason for this
is that the interest is not taxed to the DISC and is a deduction for
the borrower-shareholder and the dividend is taxed to the borrower-
shareholder. '"2 Producer's loans can be renewed indefinitely for five-
year periods, as long as three conditions are met at each renewal: (1)
the producer's loans cannot exceed an amount equal to the value of
all U.S. assets multiplied by the percentage of export receipts to total
receipts; (2) the borrower must increase his investment during the
year the loan is made in U.S. assets or in research and development;2 4
(3) the shareholders of a DISC are treated as receiving dividends to
the extent that an increase in foreign investment is attributable to
these loans. 25 This rule, the "fugitive capital" limitation, was im-
posed with the balance of payments in mind, in order to deter out-
flows of the DISC's tax-deferred profits.
A third advantage arises in that special inter-company pricing
rules are granted which allow for more profit than would be possible
under a section 482 "arm's length" arrangement. The safe haven
rules allow a DISC to earn on sales either four percent of the qualified
export receipts on the sale, or 50 percent of the combined taxable
income of the DISC, whichever is greater; plus, in both cases, ten
percent of the export promotion expenses. Thus, the DISC's profits
19. DISC, A HANDBOOK FOR EXPORTERS 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DISC
HANDBOOK]; Rev. Rul. 72-166, 1972-1 CuM. BuLL. 220.
20. CODE § 995(b)(1).
21. Id.
22. CODE § 993(1).
23. Disc HANDBOOK, at 21; CODE § 995(b)(1)(A).
24. Disc HANDBOOK, at 21-22.
25. CODE § 995(b), (d).
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will include at least some of the manufacturing profits in addition to
its own."6
When liquidation or permanent disqualification of the DISC oc-
curs, the fourth benefit is realized. Although previously untaxed prof-
its are taxable to the manufacturer as a dividend, the tax is payable
over as many years (up to ten) as the DISC had been in existence.
2 7
The 50 percent tax deferral and the special inter-company pric-
ing rules result in an effective reduction of current federal income tax
liability from 48 percent to 36 percent, and, in some cases, to 24
percent. If a manufacturer had a normal rate of return on export sales
of four percent or less, the DISC inter-company pricing rules con-
tained in section 994 would enable attribution of all of the profits to
the DISC. Since only 50 percent of the DISC income is deemed dis-
tributed, the parent would only be taxed on one-half of the gain, for
an effective rate of 24 percent. 8
As of June, 1974, there were over 5000 DISCs, which was an
increase from the 2000 in operation at the end of 1972.29 But they have
not been operating without some cost in terms of lost tax revenue.
Initial estimates of DISC operating costs ran from $600 million to $1.1
billion,3 and Treasury Secretary Simon recently stated that the reve-
nue costs of the first year of DISC operation (1972) were somewhat
higher than expected due to the high DISC profits in that year 2 ' Any
immediate loss to the government, however, is somewhat compen-
sated by the eventual increase in revenue due to the "multiplier"
effect as the profits are spread throughout the economy, and this
point is emphasized by the proponents of DISC.
32
Although the overall value of DISC is unclear, the provisions
remain in force, and their potential, as well as actual, international
effects continue to be debated. As indicated previously, one question
that was raised from the outset was whether a DISC operation would
violate the prohibition of certain types of export subsidies enumer-
ated in Article XVI of GATT. 33 In order to understand the purposes
26. Statement by S. Surrey, Hearings on H.R. 10947 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 733 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance].
27. CODE § 995(b)(2)(B).
28. Anninger, supra note 1, at 400 n. 42.
29. Statement by W. Simon, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance].
30. Anninger, supra note 1, at 406.
31. 1974 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 29.
32. Anninger, supra note 1, at 406.
33. Article XVI(4) of GATT reads as follows:
Contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly
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of GATT, and how the DISC provisions might run afoul of the tariff
treaty, a brief examination of the history and major provisions of
GATT is necessary.
I. GATT
After World War Two, GATT was drafted as a first step toward
the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO), and the
elimination of tariffs that were then the major cause of distorted
trade patterns . 4 The ITO was never created due to political squab-
bles, and instead the GATT treaty was institutionalized to take its
place. The United States was apparently not unduly concerned about
the entrenching of GATT (along with certain provisions it contained
which were not entirely favorable to the U.S.) after World War Two,
since at that time the U.S. had the dominant economy. The U.S. also
accepted, on a de facto basis, certain restrictive practices by other
countries; since the U.S. economy was so strong in relation to the rest
of the world, these "obtacles" to free trade actually served to return
world trade to some sort of balance, and were not considered disequi-
librating factors 5
Although restrictive tariffs are the most well known barriers to
any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary
product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a
price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to
buyers in the domestic market.
GATT, annex I, ad. art. XVI, Interpretative Note to Art. XVI reads as follows:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by
the like product when destined for domestic production, or the remission
of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have
accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
Article III reads:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other inter-
nal charges . . . should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic production .... The products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject ... to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indi-
rectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall
apply otherwise internal taxes or other charges to imported or domestic
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth [above] ....
IV GATTr: BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as
GATT: BISD]. No threats of countervailing duties have been made as a result of
DISC, although the European Economic Community did request consultations under
Art. XXIII concerning the consistency of DISC with GATT'. The United States in turn
requested consultation regarding the tax system of the European countries. Testimony
of R. Cole, 1972 Hearings on Gov. Procurement, supra note 16, at 163-64.
34. Jackson, supra note 14, at 250.
35. Hemmendinger, Non-Tariff Trade Barriers, 63 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L.
PROCEEDINGS 204, 206 (1969).
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free trade, many non-tariff trade barriers can be implemented, and
have been assuming a role of greater importance. For example, quan-
titative restrictions on imports are considered the most effective, al-
though somewhat cumbersome to administer. Also possible are "buy
national" programs for government procurement, artificially high
valuation of imports for customs purposes, subsidization of internal
agricultural production to lessen the influence of more efficiently
produced imports, use of countervailing duties, use of anti-dumping
duties, manipulation of size and quality controls, and tax incentives
for exporters, to name just a few .
3
GATT itself did not contain an enforcement procedure to be
applied to those states who chose to violate its provisions, but relied
instead on individual self-help in the form of retaliation. 7 Although
it was the goal of GATT to eliminate distortions in the normal pat-
tern of international trade created by non-tariff barriers such as sub-
sidies, the GATT members could not decide on a specific course of
action in regard to these practices. 8 In fact, there was even some
difficulty at the outset in defining precisely what consistuted a for-
bidden subsidy,9 although Art. III (8)(b) provided a clue by allowing
subsidies on production but not on exports.'0
The original GATT contained a provision (Art. XVI) calling for
consultations if a forbidden subsidy were employed, and it was not
until 1955 that it was significantly strengthened." By 1961, a GATT
working party was able to produce a non-exclusive list of eight forbid-
den practices under Art. XVI.12 From this list, two forbidden prac-
tices are important for the purposes of DISC:
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes
or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial enterprises;
(d) The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or
taxes, other than charges in connection with importation or indirect taxes
levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for internal
consumption; or the payment, in respect of exported goods, of amounts
exceeding those effectively levied at one or several stages on these goods
in the form of indirect taxes or of charges in connection with importation
or in both forms.
36. Metzger, Non-Tariff Trade Barriers: New Liberalization or New
Protectionism?, 63 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 203 (1969).
37. K. DAM, THE GATT - LAW & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 81
(1970); Comment, Attacks on the United States Import Surcharge under Domestic &
International Law: A Pragmatic Analysis, 6 J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 269, 271 (1972).
38. Anninger, supra note 1, at 394-95.
39. GATf: BISD supra note 33, (9th Supp.), at 185-201 (1961); GATT: BISD id.,
(10th Supp.) 208 (1962).
40. Note, supra note 1, at 89.
41. See supra note 16.
42. GATT: BISD supra note 33, (9th Supp.), at 185-87 (1961).
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In order to determine whether DISC should be considered a vio-
lation of Art. XVI, a closer examination of the provisions of the treaty
and the statute, in terms of current economic needs, is necessary.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR DISC
Economics: Theory and Practice
If we apply the adage that "taxes delayed are taxes saved," it
would appear that a DISC tax deferral might be considered a sub-
sidy. 3 The 95 percent rule contained in DISC clearly would provide
the benefits for exporting and not for manufacturing, and could not
thus be allowed as a subsidy on production. Furthermore, the fact
that producer's loans can be indefinitely renewed effectively makes
the tax liability so remote as to be almost nonexistent." Although
Art. XII allows use of certain measures to act as temporary remedies
for balance of payments problems, it is argued that since DISC provi-
sions are arbitrary in terms of their size and impact, and since they
are not a temporary measure, they would not fall under the exception
granted by this article. 5
The major objection to this approach is the fact that GATT
allows member countries to relieve exports of indirect taxes (such as
value added taxes) as they leave the country, and to impose on im-
ports a tax equal to that borne by similar domestic items." "Border
taxes" are not considered to be either a tariff or a subsidy, since, at
the time GATT was promulgated, it was assumed that indirect taxes
were fully reflected in the price of the goods, while direct taxes (such
as an income tax) were not, and therefore were not entitled to an
export rebate or an import add-on. 7
Since the United States does not rely on indirect taxes to any
significant extent, and since, as will be seen, the theory that indirect
taxes are fully reflected in the price of the item is open to serious
doubt, it would appear that this provision of GATT is indeed inequit-
able.
This distinction in treatment developed because the GATT pro-
vision allowing a rebate at the border of taxes "borne by the product"
43. Similar tax deferral provisions contained in the WHTC provisions might be
due for similar challenge but for the "grandfather" clause which provided that GA'TT
would be applied to "the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation."
GATT Protocol, para. 2(b), 61 Stat. A2051 adopted Oct. 30, 1947.
44. The Accounting Principles Board has taken the position that the contingent
tax liability, related to DISC tax-deferred income, need not be considered in the
compilation of annual earnings. Anninger, supra note 1, at 404.
45. Id. at 413.
46. See supra note 16.
47. Nolan, The Impact of the Federal Tax Structure on Exports and the DISC
Proposal, in PRIVATE INvESTORs ABROAD - PROBLEMS & SOLuTIONS IN 1971 127, 136.
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was interpreted to include a tax on the product itself, such as an
excise or value-added tax, and not a corporate income tax (for exam-
ple).48 As mentioned above, the theory behind this practice is that
direct taxes, such as a corporate income tax, is fully shifted back to
the producer, by reducing after-tax corporate profits. An indirect tax
would, under this formulation, be fully shifted forward and paid by
the customer."9 Unfortunately, though this view is in serious doubt
today, it still derives much strength from a tradition wherein income
taxes were not sufficiently important to justify the administrative
machinery for border tax adjustments, and the feeling that the calcu-
lations necessary for such rebates would be too complex to utilize
regularly.50
In fact, the opposite situation may be true. It is often difficult
to calculate the total amount of cascade turnover taxes or indirect
taxes on multifunction capital equipment." It is also frequently diffi-
cult to categorize a tax as either direct or indirect since they may
contain elements of both.2 Value added taxes are considered indirect,
but they often fall on both the costs and the profits of the producer.
To the extent they fall on the profits, it is difficult to distinguish them
from an income tax. On the opposite side, corporate taxes are usually
classified as direct. However, it is possible for a corporate tax reduc-
tion to stimulate increased spending, which would lead to increased
demand, and, eventually, increased prices.53
In reality, the ability to shift forward either an indirect or direct
tax depends not upon a rule of economics, but rather upon the prod-
uct itself, attitudes toward taxation, general economic conditions, the
percentage of market control exercised by the seller, and the ease or
restrictiveness of the monetary policy at the time of the transaction.
5 4
Under one theory, the general trend for capital concentration that
leads to oligopolies in productive industries tends to negate the theory
of marginal pricing and total direct tax absorption. If any tax is
considered as a cost of doing business, which would be true of all
48. K. DAM, supra note 37, at 211; Anninger, supra note 1, at 402.
49. Anninger, supra note 1, at 416.
50. K. DAM, supra note 37, at 214.
51. Id. at 211, 214.
52. King, Countervailing Duties: An Old Remedy with New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW.
1179, 1188 (1969).
53. Staff Analysis of Certain Issues Raised by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on International Trade of the
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 921, 926 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l. Trade]; M. VON STEINAECHER, DOMESTIC TAXA-
TION AND FOREIGN TRADE: THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN BORDER TAX DISPUTE 27 (1973);
J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE & THE LAW OF THE GATT 298 (1969).
54. Nolan, supra note 47, at 138.
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businesses except monopolies (which would be able to pass the cost
along), the tax must be included in the income and the price.5
Reduced taxes on exports could result in either lower prices (if
the competition was present to force down the price, or if lack of
demand accomplished the same thing) or more profit to the seller.
The possibility of high profits due to a tax incentive could attract
other firms even if the end result was not lower prices to the foreign
consumer.56 One suggested test for the rebate of taxes is the extent
to which prices are altered by the tax,5 7 but, as can be seen, in the
normal economic world the combination of pressures is such that it
would be difficult if not impossible to determine what portion of a
given price was actually influenced by a tax. From a theoretical
standpoint, however, if any of the tax (whether direct or indirect) is
absorbed by the seller, who then receives a rebate of all taxes paid,
the extent to which the tax was absorbed is essentially a subsidy."
It would therefore'appear that value added or similar taxes are
not entirely deserving of the treatment they receive, and that rebates
of border taxes place goods from a country that does not depend on
indirect taxes to a significant extent at a comparative disadvantage.
Changed Conditions
By 1975, major changes had occurred which made many of the
1948 assumptions, which were still operative in GATT, obsolete. In
addition to the changes in economic theory noted above, the five-year
"Kennedy Round" of GATT negotiations had effectively eliminated
tariffs as major barriers to world trade. With tariffs out of the way,
non-tariff trade barriers, such as direct and indirect subsidies to ex-
ports are receiving more attention. Also, the pattern of world trade
has been significantly altered, with the U.S. in a negative balance of
trade posture, and no longer in the comfortable role of leading ex-
porter. Thus, it would appear that the U.S. can no longer afford to
be "generous" in regard to the restrictive practices of other countries;
nor can it confine its attention to only tariff-type restraints.
Finally, the petroleum situation has markedly changed the out-
look of most industrial countries to the point where balance of pay-
ments deficits, instead of resulting in "mere" inflation, now threaten
55. Lindholm, National Tax Systems and International Balance of Payments, 19
NAT'L TAX. J. 163, 167 (1966).
56. J. GASTON & W. SMITH, BORDER TAXES & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
COOPERATION 86 (1969).
57. R. MUSGRAVE, FIScAL SYSTEMS 277 n. 9 (1969).
58. Note, supra note 1, at 96. It is difficult to ascertain the exact extent to which
reliance on a direct or indirect system of taxation will prejudice a country when dealing
with another country using a different system of taxation.
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to bankrupt the economies of several countries. Although the United
States is not yet at this point, the importance of maintaining exports,
to at least partially offset currency flowing out to support oil pur-
chases, has received renewed emphasis.
It is for these reasons that the application of rebus sic stantibus
should be considered appropriate. No grand moral principles or per-
emptory norms of international law are sought to be avoided. Rather,
the use of rebus sic stantibus would make a relatively successful
international agreement fair and functional in its current setting.
Retention of a familiar framework, albeit with a slightly different
interpretation, would ultimately promote international trade, and
avoid the need to scrap GATT and begin anew.
CONCLUSION
As has been shown, both the economic conditions and economic
theories that prevailed in 1948, when GATT was promulgated, no
longer obtain. While these two points are the strongest arguments in
support of DISC, other points have been raised in various forums
which should be considered briefly.
One of the cornerstones of the Treasury's initial presentation of
DISC was that, in strict terms, GATT nowhere forbids a deferral of
taxes, as opposed to an outright rebate. 9 While ostensibly appealing,
this argument loses much of its force when one realizes that, as noted
previously, the present value to a corporation of 15 years of tax defer-
ral is approximately equal to the tax itself.6 0
Another argument that has been raised is the fact that since
GATT has never been ratified by the Senate, it carries only the status
of an executive agreement in the United States, and cannot contra-
dict any U.S. laws.' This is certainly true, but it would seem to do
violence to the entire concept of executive agreements (which are
unquestionably a valuable tool of international relations), if Congress
felt inclined to prove its point by legislatively "flexing its muscles"
without considering adequately the underlying problems.
More important is the consideration of the overall economic
framework in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES must attempt
to utilize the GATT provisions. Currently, many countries in the
world face a sudden balance of payments crisis not only as a result
of profligate consumption, but due also to the sudden acceleration of
petroleum prices. In this context, narrow legalistic readings of GATT
59. Letter from Roy T. Englert to Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, June 16, 1970, found in
Anninger, supra note 1, at 393 n. 12.
60. Statement by S. Surrey, 1971 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance
supra note 26.
61. 1971 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, supra note 53.
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provisions regarding the right of a member nation to attempt to offset
some of its balance of payments problems are inappropriate.
It may be proper to justify the use of DISC as a currency stabili-
zation program, to aid the U.S. balance of payments. Since the dollar
still serves as a reserve currency in the international monetary sys-
tem, it would therefore be in the interest of all parties to stabilize the
dollar.
In addition to the unique role played by the dollar, DISC may
also serve a valuable function as a compensatory export subsidy and
as a means to counteract the border tax adjustments. The number
of countries that, directly or indirectly, grant export subsidies is
rather large, 2 and, since these practices are arguably also violations
of GATT, these countries should have some difficulty in justifying
their own programs if they choose to challenge DISC.
The U.S. does have the option of imposing countervailing duties,
and court cases have unanimously reaffirmed U.S. domestic power to
do this."3 This, however, would be a drastic measure, and would prob-
ably be perceived as a more aggressive tactic than the DISC program,
so it should be reserved for a last resort or for uniquely egregious
individual cases.
It would then seem that the only possible long range solution,
short of a major re-write of GATT, is to adopt a rebus sic stantibus
position in regard to changed economic circumstances, and the inval-
idization of economic theories upon which the original document was
based. Such an adaptation of GATT has already occurred: the use of
temporary import surcharges by the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain
would possibly indicate a de facto amendment to at least that provi-
sion of GATT when other members failed to take any action."
Rebus sic stantibus is seen by many as an extreme position,
adopted as a last resort, legalistic method to maintain at least the
facade of adherence to principles of international law while at the
same time attempting to be relieved of treaty burdens that are un-
wanted. But the position of the U.S. has not been to adopt this
posture flippantly, for they just as well could have stated that since
62. A summary of some of the tax incentives used by major trading partners of
the U.S. is found at Hearings on S.2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce
& Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-83, at 149
(1972). A table providing a summary of export incentives offered by the major in-
dustrial countries is found at INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS, U.N. Doc
TD/B/C.2/89 Rev. 1 (1967). The existence of these subsidy programs is not seriously
questioned, and they have therefore not been extensively covered in this Comment.
63. King, supra note 52, at 1179-85.
64. K. DAM, supra note 37, at 32; Comment, supra note 37, at 274.
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GATT was never ratified by the Senate it cannot bind the U.S. as
against contrary domestic legislation.
Adoption of the rebus argument by the U.S. would be the appro-
priate middle ground between going along with outdated and unfair
provisions of GATT or calling for its total revision and encountering
the predictable political impossibility of drafting a new document.
The current dispute is primarily between the U.S. and Europe. The
two sides have shown they abide by the generally accepted principles
of international law. In that framework, a solution can be found.
Theodore L. Banks
